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GATT AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE




Although it has recently become the norm for policymakers to
pay homage to the "emerging global economy," authorities have
long recognized that there has always been a global economy.
What separates the present from the past is not the existence of
international trade and interdependence but, rather, the speed at
which such contacts occur and the degree to which individual na-
tional economies are dependent upon one another, upon regional
blocs, and upon the global system as a whole. This Article will not
attempt to create a model or paradigm for understanding this sys-
tem but will focus instead on explaining the historical and legal
antecedents that gave rise to the current global trading system.
The Uruguay Round1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) produced two crucial developments that will have
far-reaching consequences. One development is the solidification
of a global free trade system.2 The second is the commitment of all
* Gerald Bunting, BA. History, Trinity College (1986), M.A. International Relations,
New York University (1993), J.D. St. John's University (1993). Mr. Bunting is an attorney
practicing international and corporate law in New York City.
1 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. §3501 (1995)); see Kenneth W. Abbot, GATT As A Public Institu-
tion: The Uruguay Round and Beyond, 18 BROOK J. INT'L L. 31, 31 (1992) (describing Uru-
guay Round as "broadest and most complex round of trade negotiations in GATTs his-
tory"). See generally William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, 19 FoRDHAm IN'L. L.J. 427, 427 (1995) (noting that agreements which
came out of these negotiations "were designed to fundamentally restructure and improve
the multilateral trading system that had developed under the 1947 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GA'T)").
2 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, COMPLETING THE URUGUAY RouND: A RESULTS-ORIENTED AP-
PROACH TO THE GATr TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 180 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1990) (noting impor-
tance of negotiations with respect to future of global trading system); see also JEFFREY J.
SCHOTT, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASsEssMENT 17 (1994) [hereinafter THE URUGUAY
RoUND] (discussing one of reforms of Uruguay Round as trade liberalization gains, which
makes available more resources for additional consumption and investment, while promot-
ing increased productivity).
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member nations to a single dispute resolution forum.3 This sec-
ond development is critical for the on-going development of inter-
national law, for it symbolizes an important surrender of sover-
eignty by individual nation-states to an international body
operating under one unified code. This is far more significant
than, for example, an individual state acceding to the United Na-
tions. The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of how
the pre-GATT "system" of international trade evolved in a histori-
cal context. This analysis is not all-inclusive-one would require
hundreds of pages for a brief but thorough outline. This article
merely highlights examples of how the Western laissez-faire ap-
proach to commerce, in concert with distinctly American legal doc-
trines, laid the economic foundations for the system GATT and the
World Trade Organization (WTO) seek to police.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE
MODERN WORLD
The notion of "a single global marketplace" is hardly new. In-
deed, civilization has been evolving to such an economic unity for
centuries.4 Even with protectionist regimes in place in many re-
gions, competitive advantages and market demand encouraged
the growth of global trade despite the existence of national and
regional trade barriers.
Commerce that extends beyond national boundaries has always
served two obvious but distinct functions. The first function is to
secure resources or goods that are unavailable (i.e., not found nor
economically producible within the state).5 Conversely, the second
3 See THE URUGUAY RouND, supra note 2, at 14. Uruguay Round restored credibility to
the multilateral negotiating process and ensured ongoing regional initiatives. Id. The Uru-
guay Round also strengthened the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), a multilat-
eral dispute settlement mechanism, by creating the WTO. Id.
4 See KLAus FRIEDRICH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 279, 292-93
(1974) (describing Classical Gold Standard as example of nations seeking a degree of eco-
nomic unity); see also THoMAs GRENNEs, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 3 (1984) (citing Euro-
pean Economic Community as attempt to connect independent countries into single eco-
nomic unit); CHESTER G. STARR, A HISTORY OF THE ANcEENT WoRL 313 (2d ed. 1974)
(detailing Athens' import and export trade with, among others, Macedonia, Thrace, and
Libya).
5 See, e.g., GRENNEs, supra note 4, at 12. Foods originally introduced to countries
through international trade that have since become identified with those countries include:
chocolate, not known in Europe until the 17th Century when imported from Mexico, and
tea, brought from China to Europe in 1610 by the Dutch. Id. Grennes notes other advan-
tages of international trade, specifically the increased availability of less expensive prod-
ucts as well as information regarding new products and technologies. Id.
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impetus for international trade is the need to seek outside mar-
kets for resources and goods produced in surplus within the state.
The impulses behind this export paradigm are multifold. Individ-
ual traders seek to maximize profits by selling in new markets.
Concurrently, governments seek to control and/or maximize ex-
portation to create a favorable balance of trade in which the net
valuation of exports exceeds the net valuation of imports. This
goal, in theory, advances the national interest and contributes to
the prosperity of society.
National interest is similarly involved with the importation par-
adigm. A state which imports more than it exports can be at a
disadvantage because the balance of payments (in gold) flow
abroad causing potentially serious domestic social and economic
consequences. Because of the qualitative and quantitative domes-
tic implications, issues of trade policy are necessarily political is-
sues. Comprehension of these domestic issues by Seventeenth
Century European policymakers resulted in the competitive rise
of "mercantilist" empires. Not only was a favorable balance of
trade viewed as essential for domestic reasons, but it was tied res-
olutely to national security issues.7 Adam Smith, the godfather of
capitalism, summed up this statist approach to international
trade:
[Tihat wealth consisted in gold and silver, and that those met-
als could be brought into a country which had no mines only
by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater value
than it imported; it necessarily became the great object of
political economy to diminish as much as possible the impor-
tation of foreign goods for home consumption and to increase
as much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestic
industry.8
6 See AD)AM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 415 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (noting that
greatest advantage to foreign trade is sale of country's surplus, not importation of gold and
silver).
7 See generally JOAN EDELMON SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA-
ToNs 4, 5 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing how production, consumption, and distribution have
been affected by diplomatic and strategic factors and how mercantilists believed that
wealth and power were so related to acquisition of precious metals that in order to main-
tain favorable balance of trade they had to organize trading structures).
8 See SMrrH, supra note 6, at 418. See generally JOSEPH CROPSEY, PoLrrY AND EcONOMY:
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ADAm SMITH 95 (1957) (arguing that Smith be-
lieved free political institutions are essential in order to preserve commerce).
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The incessant warfare of Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century Eu-
rope involved large mercenary forces which consumed a substan-
tial portion of Europe's annual Gross Domestic Product. Trade
surpluses were essential for maintaining these armies in the field.
The ever-increasing need to expand foreign markets and simulta-
neously gain access to inexpensively obtained natural resources
led to colonial expansion in the Western hemisphere, in Africa and
in the Indian Sub-Continent.9 Such expansion was in pursuit of
perfecting mercantilist policies and similarly resulted in armed
conflict. 10 Trade wars of this period focused on preserving trade
monopolies in a given sphere such as the Dutch Republic's trade
with India. I" Conflicts that had their origins in other issues, such
as the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1713), inevitably involved
trade issues.12 For example, Britain's acquisition of the asiento,
the monopoly granting the exclusive right to sell slaves to Spanish
possessions in South America, was wrested from Spain by the
Peace of Utrecht as Britain's price for interceding in this Bourbon-
Habsburg conflict. 13
Wars of this period also were brought about by the prevailing
mercantilist notion that commerce was static and that the world
could only support a definite volume of commerce.14 In light of this
notion, for one nation to increase its share of the world's trade it
would have to be at the expense of other nations.' 5 This idea had
9 See SPERO, supra note 7, at 5. "Mercantilist states acquired colonies for the purpose of
favorable trade balances and for the political goal of self sufficiency." Id..
10 The First and Second Anglo-Dutch Wars of 1664 and 1678, for example, were fought
purely over commercial rivalries. See generally JONATHAN ISRAEL, THE DUTCH REPUBLIC
713-15, 934-36 (1995) (chronicling how trade conflict resulted in war between Dutch Re-
public and England).
11 See, e.g., id. at 941 (noting Dutch mercantile system in Asia, Africa, and America was
based on Dutch control of colonies and sea routes).
12 A dynastic squabble ostensibly over whether a Bourbon or a Habsburg would sit on
the Spanish Throne. See generally HENRY KAMEN, THE WAR OF SUCCESSION IN SPAIN (1700-
1715) 1-5, 9 (1969).
13 See KAMEN, supra note 12, at 24. The Peace of Utrecht granted England the asiento for
slave trade to Americas. Id..
14 See Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the
United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. Bus. L. J. 553 (1994). The view of mercan-
tilists was that wealth was not limitless and one of the principle means of acquiring such"
wealth was diverting it from other nations.
15 See ELI HECKSCHER, MERCANTILISM 260 (1936) (outlining origins and development of
mercantilist competition; see also 2 DAvm HUME, ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY
348 (1898) (quoting prominent merchant who stated in Parliament: "Our trade will im-
prove by the total extinction of theirs").
[Vol. 11:505
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its antecedents in ancient history and was the cause of many con-
fficts throughout human history. 16
It is important to bear in mind that for our purposes, global
trade and international relations of this period are viewed exclu-
sively in the European dimension. 17 The Treaty of Westphalia
(1648), which ended the Thirty-Years War, codified the concept of
national sovereignty. Under this enduring concept, the nation-
state became the principal player on the international stage. Sov-
ereignty of the nation-state secured the primacy of that state's
government and legal regime within its borders. Although this in-
violability was often ignored at first, gradually the right of a na-
tion-state to manage its internal affairs became sacrosanct. Only
when a nation-state's conduct threatened the balance of power on
the Continent did other states feel justified in forming alliances to
intervene internally and restore the balance. The balance of
power system, if one is to call it that, was the only device available
to regulate relations between sovereign states.'8
A comparison can be made, albeit simplistically, between the in-
dividual and society and between the nation-state and the inter-
national community as a whole. The individual theoretically sur-
renders his complete freedom of action to society and consents to
adhere to its laws. Likewise, in the international system, the na-
tion-state agrees, by treaty or executive action, to adhere to a set
of internationally recognized norms or rules. In the case of the
individual autonomous person, once adherence is obtained, the co-
ercive aspect of law (force) ensures continuous obedience to the
legal regime of society. In the case of the nation-state, however,
the coercive aspect of the international community is barely pres-
ent. There exists no uniform global means of compelling nation-
16 The Punic Wars, which had as their origin the conflict between the Roman and
Cartheginian commercial empires, is just one example. See PoLYmUS, THE RIsE OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE 53-56 (Ian Scott-Kilvet trans., 1979); see also BRILAN CAVEN, THE PuNIC
WARs 183 (1980).
17 Sophisticated trade also existed between peoples in Africa, North America, and Asia
so that Europe was the rule, not the exception. See Ballam, supra note 14, at 557 (discuss-
ing basis of American colonial mercantilism as European in nature); see also Paul Lansing
& Joseph Gabriella, Clarifying Gray Market Gray Areas, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 313, 329-30
(1993) (noting Japan's historical practice of neo-mercantilism, developed from European
system).
18 See, e.g., HANs MORGANTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLrrIcS AMONG NATIONS 362
(6th ed. 1985) (discussing flaws of balance of power system that led to its collapse). But see
INts L. CLAUDE, JR., SwoRDs INTO PLowsHARES 24-27 (4th ed. 1984). Inis Claude offers the
Concert of Europe as attempt to systematize and police the balance of power in the Nine-
teenth century.
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states to adhere to international law. Attempts to cobble together
some sort of system that is both "fair" and coercive in the Twenti-
eth Century have largely failed. Even when a nation-state has
joined itself to an international body, it feels itself bound only so
long as its national interests require such membership. In the
1930s, for example, Italy was content to remain part of the League
of Nations only until that body rejected Italy's aggression against
Ethiopia. Likewise, Iraq demonstrated the futility of voluntary
adherence to international law when its perceived national inter-
ests drove it to occupy Kuwait in 1990. In both instances, the
global community was forced to confront its impotence in enforc-
ing the international law.19
With the nation-state ascendent after 1648,20 the idea that
there existed a higher polity, the international community, was
non-existent. International trade, as with war and diplomacy,
was conducted under a vague set of occasionally recognized
norms. There existed no higher legal authority than that enforced
by individual states. There was no United Nations, no Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, and no permanent association of sovereign
states.2 ' Such a vacuum could not, in the ordinary course, exist for
long.
Expansion of the scope and volume of world trade should have
created the necessity for some sort of international system as the
age-old balance of power system was incapable of dealing with
19 I will tactfully suggest here that the "success" of the international system in respond-
ing to the Kuwait crisis was chimerical and is highly unlikely to occur again soon. It was
the unusual timing which found a weak, dissolved Soviet Union, an indifferent China, and
an unbalanced Middle East forced to rely on the United States and a Western Alliance
unusually cohesive under then-President Bush.
20 See 3 DAVID J. HILL, A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF
EUROPE 1-2 (1914) (discussing state of affairs in Europe after Peace of Westphalia and
ascendancy of European nations); see also 6 W.F. REDDAWAY, A HISTORY OF EUROPE FROM
1610-1715 199 (1948). The treaties of 1648 "formed the greatest landmark in the political
history of the 17th century, and perhaps the greatest in the record of modern times.... "
Id.
21 See JOHN S. ODELL, U.S. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY 5 (1982) (noting that inter-
national monetary regime dates from Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, where United
States was main "architect" of such regime, making United States markets and United
States dollar "central pillars" in international market); see also A.F.K. ORGANSKI, WORLD
POLITICS 454-55 (2d ed. 1968) (citing official birth date of United Nations as 1945, with
intention of universal membership); ROBERT L. WENDZEL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS POLICY.
MAKERS AND POLICYMAKING 12 (1981) (noting displacement of League of Nations by United
Nations through number of multilateral wartime conferences); LELAND B. YEAGER, INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS 390 (2d ed. 1966) (stating that International Monetary
Fund was drafted and signed by 44 nations at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July
1944 and ratified by requisite number of nations by end of 1945).
[Vol. 11:505
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trade issues. The balance of power system, nevertheless, perse-
vered up until the Twentieth century. The reason for this perse-
verance was that from the late Seventeenth century onwards, in-
ternational commerce was dominated continuously by Britain,
which used its naval supremacy and resulting financial resources
to maintain the balance of power on land and to control the sea
lanes unilaterally through which the world's commerce flowed.22
Sea power combined with shrewd geopolitical gamesmanship per-
mitted England to preserve the balance of power and to regulate
the course of international trade in the absence of a formal inter-
national regime.23
By way of example, the seizure of Gibraltar from Spain in 1713
and the construction there of a naval base, gave England control
of access to the entire Mediterranean Sea.24 This acquisition, and
the later construction of the Suez Canal, provided Britain with the
means to interfere with the commerce of every state from Spain
and Morocco in the West to the Ottoman Empire and Russia in the
East.25 Thus, Britain alone possessed the ability to close off the
commerce of Continental powers.26
This interrelation of commerce and power politics was a
profound barrier to free trade for centuries.27 Because the mainte-
nance of the balance of power often necessitated interference with
trade, it can be reasoned that a free trade system such as GATT
22 See PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY 37-122 (1982)
(discussing power of Great Britain as predominant maritime nation, vis-a-vis national, in-
ternational, economic, political, and strategic considerations); ALFRED T. MAHAN, THE IN-
FLUENCE OF SEAPOWER UPON HISTORY 1660-1783 217 (12th ed. 1890) (analyzing evolution
of Britain's maritime dominance); see also ALFRED T. MAHAN, MAHAN ON NAVAL WARFARE
152-53 (Allan Westcott, Ph.D. ed., 1943) [hereinafater MAHAN ON NAVAL WARFARE] (demon-
strating importance of England's acquisitions during and after Seven Years War).
23 See CHARLES A. JONES, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 64-65(1987) (noting pre-eminence of British mercantile system); see also Kennedy, supra note 22,
at 149-75 (discussing England's lead in world economy and adoption of free trade); MoR-
GANTHAU & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 363-64 (observing that political, military, and
economic preponderance allows such nation to balance power).
24 See generally HILL, supra note 20, at 305.
25 See MAHAN ON NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 22, at 152-53 (discussing England's con-
trolling seapower and territorial acquisitions).
26 For example, by controlling Gibraltar, the British were able to prevent the French, for
several hundred years, from concentrating their entire fleet in one sea.
27 Both the War of 1812 and United States entry into the First World War were largely
caused by disruptions of United States commerce by European belligerents. See JOHN KEE-
GAN, THE PRiCE OF ADmnimALTY 15-19 (1988). Keegan offers an extensive analysis of the
practical economic and military implications of ritain's stranglehold over the Mediterra-
nean in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.
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was not possible so long as the international order was main-
tained solely by the balance of power system.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIMES
Although throughout most of history international trade was
carried out between sovereign entities, it should be borne in mind
that there were exceptions. Indeed, the notion that free trade be-
tween states could benefit all parties is not entirely new. Since
ancient times, there have been numerous examples of deliberate
trade liberalization and regulation.
In the Fifth Century B.C., Greek city-states were grouped into
the Delian League which served as both a military and an eco-
nomic alliance. 28 Dominated by Athens, the League ensured open
sea routes that enabled the Greeks to import grain from the Black
Sea.29 It is also noteworthy that Athenian coinage became the
common currency of member states during this period.30 Exam-
ples such as this illustrate that there has always been an interna-
tional market which leagues and empires have occasionally
sought to regulate and liberalize. Contemporary history merely
reflects the latest stage of development whereby the sovereign na-
tion-states of the industrialized world, sharing a common eco-
nomic ideology and a fear of further military conflict, have created
permanent institutions to govern global commerce. 31
28 See DAVID KAISER, POLITICS AND WAR, EUROPEAN CONFLICT FROM PHILIP II TO HITLER
157 (1990) (outlining means by which continental events were shaped by Britain's mari-
time suzerainty); JAMsS MoRms, PAX BRITANNICA 52-53, 109 (1968) (illustrating benefits
derived from monopoly on seaborne commerce).
29 See STARR, supra note 4, at 313-14; see also PLUTARCH, THE RISE AND FALL OF ATHENS
186-87, 225-31 (Ian Scott-Kilvert trans. 1960).
30 See, e.g., STARR, supra note 4, at 315 (discussing Athenian "owls" as stable regional
coinage).
31 See Judith H. Bello & Alan J. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law And Policy Series No. 24:
Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28
INT'L LAw. 1095, 1098-99 (1994) (detailing how changes in WTO adjudication process will
ultimately benefit U.S.); see also Mary E. Footer, GATT And The Multilateral Regulation of
Banking Services, 27 INT'L LAW. 343 (1993) (discussing role of banking as trade in service
as well as its role in GATT); Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing World
Economy, 29 INT'L LAW. 15 (1995) (analyzing American trade law with respect to NAFTA,
WTO, and Japanese market); J.F. Hornbeck, United States.Mexico Economic Relations:
Has NAFTA Made A Difference?, 5 MEx. TRADE & L. REP. 8 (1995) (analyzing effects of
North American Free Trade Agreement among United States, Mexico, and Canada);
Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC-
TICE 3 (1995) (discussing motives and objectives of negotiating parties to WTO's Interna-
tional trade system).
[Vol. 11:505
GATT AND GLOBAL TRADE
A. United States Internationalism Under Wilson
President Wilson recognized that the breakdown of the balance
of power between 1914 and 1918 required the imposition of a new
order based on recognized legal precepts to govern political and
economic relations among states.3 2 Wilson also used this break-
down as an opportunity to promote free trade and universal access
to markets.3 3 As both an attorney and a professor of American his-
tory, Wilson was uniquely suited to fashion a proposed structure
based on American legalistic principles.3 4 Wilson was aware that
any new world order would have to guarantee open access to inter-
national markets to succeed.a Moreover, this guarantee could
only be credible if backed by the sanction of international law.
Hence, Wilson's proposed League of Nations36 and World Court 7
would have had to play prominent roles as institutions responsible
for enforcing a new international trade system.
Regrettably, Wilson also had to contend with other forces at
work in Europe-reactionary nationalists unwilling to abandon
the balance of power formula and socialists seeking an interna-
tional system centered on Marxist determinist theories.38
Daunted by shifts in European public opinion, stubborn allies,
weak support at home, and his own inflexible personality, Wilson
was unable to persuade the Allies to adopt his principles. In the
32 N. GORDON LEVIN, JR., WOODROW WILSON AND WORMD POLITICS 9, 123-28 (1968).
33 See id. at 14-18 (noting that Wilson viewed commercial health of United States as
evidence of country's political and moral strength). See generally CARL P. PARINI, HEIR TO
EMPIRE: UNITED STATES ECONoMic DmLomAcY, 1916-1923 3-212 (1969) (arguing that foun-
dations of modern American international economic policy were solidly laid by Wilson
Administration).
34 See ARTHUR S. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1910-1917 (1954)
(principles set forth in Wilson's January 22, 1917 "Peace Without Victory" speech). See
generally ARTHUR S. LIN, WOODROW WILSON: REVOLUTIONS, WAR, AND PEACE 1-20 (1979)
(tracing Wilson's political thinking to his devout beliefs in law, democracy, religion, and
ethics).
35 See THoMA J. KNOCK, To END ALL WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE QUEST FOR A
NEW WORLD ORDER 51, 56-57 (1992).
36 See generally MARGARET E. BURTON, THE ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 61
passim (1974) (discussing creation of league of nations).
37 See generally THoMAs M. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 13-27 (1986) (provid-
ing general history of World Court); MANLEY 0. HUDSON, THE WORLD COURT 1-11 (1931)
(same).
33 See LEVIN, supra note 32, at 129-50. Wilson sought an "international commercial or-
der, transcending traditional military and political imperialism, in which the human, polit-
ical, and territorial rights of underdeveloped peoples would be respected, and in which the
dangers of conflict among the advanced powers would be overcome by policies of peaceful
free trade .... "Id.; see also HERBERT HOOVER, THE ORDE.AL OF WOODROW WILSON 19 (1958)
(identifying Wilsonian principles as only permanent solution to international economic and
political chaos).
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United States, the isolationist Republican Party vigorously fought
Wilson's proposals claiming that the League of Nations, with its
attendant free trade, would be an economic disaster for the domes-
tic economy.39 Ultimately, the United States Senate's rejection of
the Versailles Treaty meant that Wilsonian ideals would have to
await another generation and another war.
B. Post-WWII Economic Structure
The international system that emerged from the crucible of the
Second World War was primarily a creature of the victorious
Western Allies (i.e., Great Britain and the United States).40 Un-
like the sentiment felt between 1918 and 1919, there was a strong
consensus among Western Allied policymakers that the causes of
the Great Depression and the Second World War were related and
that, to avoid future recurrences of war and depression, a stable
international political and economic structure had to be devel-
oped. In terms of avoiding future armed conflict, the Allies em-
braced the Wilsonian view and established the United Nations.4 '
Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic concluded that the
Depression of the 1930s was caused by disparate national eco-
nomic objectives, the unilateral pursuit of these objectives, and
the failure to recognize that such national economic policies, in
the absence of any multilateral coordination, would eventually un-
dermine the global economic system. In other words, states acted
in pursuit of their own selfish interests, without recognizing that
an international system of interdependence had emerged on its
own and was easily destabilized by unilateral action.42 It was the
upsetting of this system which policymakers believed was respon-
sible (at least in large part) for the rise of fascism and the out-
break of war in 1939.
39 See KNocK, supra note 35, at 168-69. See generally HENRY CABOT LODGE, THE SENATE
AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 7-9 (1925); HERBERT F. MARGUIEES, THE MILD RESERVATION-
ISTS AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONTrROVERSY IN THE SENATE 30-31 (1989).
40 See, e.g., W.M. SCAMMELL, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY SINCE 1945 39 (2d ed. 1984)
(noting that United States and Britain adopted complementary approach to commercial
policy following World War II).
41 See 1 EvAN LuARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS: THE YEARS OF WESTERN DOMI-
NATION, 1945-1955 (1982) (discussing factors that led to establishment of United Nations).
42 See THoMAs L. ILGIN, AUTONOMY AND INTERDEPENDENCE 136 (concluding that interde-
pendence requires prudent economic management at home as well as flexible responses to
problems of coordination abroad that will inevitably arise among interwoven economies).
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Leaders in America also recognized that it was the withdrawal
of the United States following World War I and its failure to exer-
cise international leadership that hastened the collapse of the
1930s. As if overcompensating for its earlier reticence, the United
States aggressively asserted its economic, political, and military
leadership in the decades after 1945. 43 It assumed the role of the
world's central bank, primary industrial center, largest market
and, perhaps most importantly, provider of almost all initiatives
in international trade negotiations.
IV. THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM
The Bretton Woods system was designed to balance the conflict-
ing objectives of individual states pursuing separate domestic eco-
nomic programs and to maintain international monetary stability
through fixed exchange rates and currency convertibility.4 4 The
United States dollar was fixed to the gold standard and became,
like the Athenian "owl" of the Fifth Century B.C., the interna-
tional currency.45 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was
created to provide credit to states with short-term balance of pay-
ments problems-in other words, to finance deficits where
necessary.46
Under a system of weighted voting, the United States domi-
nated the IMF and managed the international monetary system
from 1945 until about 1960.47 At that point, the economies of
Western Europe and Japan had recovered and the United States
became increasingly and adversely affected by the unfavorable
balance of trade caused by the artificially high value of the dollar.
Despite its collapse in 1971, the Bretton Woods system was the
first successful regime to regulate an aspect of the international
43 See, e.g., ScAmMELL, supra note 40, at 11 (noting compliance by foreign nations under
implicit threat that United States would soon fully emerge from isolationism).
44 GADDIS SMrrH, AMERicAN Dn'LOmAcy DUPING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1941-1945 179
(1985) (providing insight into formation and early structure of IMF and World Bank and
suggesting both domestic and international imperatives involved with each).
45 See ALFRED E. ECKEs, JR., A SEARCH FOR SOLVENCY 3-4 (1975) (discussing adherence
to gold standard); see also ROBEr GILPIN, THE PoLTcAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RE-
LATIONS 132-33 (1987) (noting that adoption of gold standard made it possible for domestic
interventionism and international stability to co-exist).
46 See EcKEs, supra note 45, at 150-51 (noting that at outset money would be lent selec-
tively to potentially prosperous European countries).
47 See EcKEs, supra note 45, at 148 (noting United States dominance of IMF).
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economy.48 Fiscal stability provided by Bretton Woods was essen-
tial for post-war reconstruction. This period of monetary stability
was also important because it provided the framework within
which the early GATT rounds were negotiated.
V. A COLD WAR RE-APPRAISAL
Reconstruction of the industrialized West was accomplished
through a model of multi-national cooperation. Ruined capitalist
states faced the real and perceived military threats of the Soviet
Union. The outbreak of the Cold War in the late-1940s made it
clear that the United Nations system, by itself, was unable to
guarantee national security for the Western democracies. A pro-
gram of economic reconstruction, the Marshall Plan, beneath an
umbrella of collective security, NATO, characterized Western poli-
cies of this period.4 9
Ideological competition between the East and West ultimately
proved to be the environment in which the international trade sys-
tem and GATT developed in its current form. The East-West
schism, although based primarily on the Soviet military threat,
caused two opposing ideological and economic systems to develop
and function separately, although not in complete isolation from
one another.50 In the West, a liberal free market system with lim-
ited government oversight flourished within the framework of the
Bretton Woods/GATT regime. The East Bloc system of stringent
state-controlled economies, on the contrary, operated within the
Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) with a much lower degree of success.5 1 In essence,
the industrialized West, led by the United States, was able to use
48 See, e.g., SPERO, supra note 7, at 36 (noting that in 1947 under Bretton Woods System,
Western system was on verge of collapsing).
49 See STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, RISE To GLOBALISM 88-91 (1971) (providing expansive dis-
cussion on interrelationship between economic efforts (Marshall Plan) and European secur-
ity arrangements (NATO)).
50 See ILGiN, supra note 42, at 22 (noting that growing compatibility in economic rela-
tions among Western allies permitted United States to focus on its policy of containment of
Soviet Union).
51 See Robert W. Campbell, Soviet Economic Policies and their Impact on the Pacific-
Asian Region 102-03, 111 in PACIFIC-AsIAN ECONOMIC POLICIES AND REGIONAL INTERDEPEN-
DENCE (Robert Scalapino, et al. eds., 1988). Mr. Campbell describes the evolution of
COMECON and the Soviet attempts in the 1970s to expand its international trade while
remaining within a socialist framework. Id.; see also Charles K. Wilber & Kenneth P.
Jameson, Paradigms of Economic Development and Beyond, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 20-21 (Charles K. Wilber ed., 1988) (contrasting
Soviet and Chinese approaches to economics and trade in post-war era).
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the Cold War decades as a period to perfect their system and to
expand it gradually throughout Latin America and Asia.
Ultimately, this contest came down to a battle of economic sys-
tems, not ideologies, and it was resolved in rather Darwinian fash-
ion. Since the United States and its power bloc, consisting of
Western Europe and assorted client-states throughout the devel-
oping world, had embraced, for better or worse, the more efficient
system, it was able to exhaust economically the Russian imperium
and bring about its sudden and dramatic political collapse. With
the elimination of the bipolar contest, the inhibiting factor to the
full integration of the world's economies was removed. Trade gaps
replaced missile gaps and diplomatic crises were henceforth cre-
ated by the dumping of microchips and not by the destabilization
of client regimes.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the East Bloc at
long last enabled the system developed in the industrialized West
to "go global." If the conclusion of the Uruguay Round implies
anything at all, it is that the entire international community, with
the exception of a few rouge states, has adopted the international
trade regime developed by the West in the Cold War period.
VI. GETTING TO GATT
Post-War reconstruction and development took almost fifty
years before a final trade system emerged on which a consensus
could be reached. Although conceived in 1947, GATT took so long
because reconstruction of industrial bases and infrastructure re-
quired, in addition to global monetary stability, carefully tailored
investment and tariff policies. Because most of the industrialized
West required tariffs and non-tariff barriers to rebuild their post-
war economies, tariff elimination could not seriously be discussed
until the 1980s. 2
52 I like to believe that the Uruguay Round could have occurred earlier but for the vicis-
situdes of history. International commerce suffered from dramatic upheavals in the 1970s
which discouraged GAIT discussions. The most notable was the six-fold increase in the
price of oil by OPEC between 1973 and 1974 which threw most of the industrialized world
into a prolonged recession. The second occurrence, particularly from the United States'
viewpoint, was the advent of Japan as a global economy. Long-term stagnation, increased
competition from Japan, and a re-evaluation of Americas commitment to freer global trade
mired progress toward the goal of barrier-free trade. See United States Trade Representa-
tive, 1996 NAT'L TRADE EsTmiATE REP. ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRiERS 7, 103-04 171-72 (1996)
(providing examples of continued trade obstacles with particular emphasis on non-tariff
barriers). See generally William A. Lovett, Current World Trade Agenda: GATT, Regional-
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That barrier free trade was a premature wish in the 1940s is
best illustrated by the demise of the GATT forerunners, the Ha-
vana Charter, and the International Trade Organization (ITO). 53
Both institutions fell victim to the developmental priorities of in-
dividual states, although many experts today would argue that
barrier-free trade in the 1940s would have been a greater stimu-
lus for economic recovery than the protectionist schemes
adopted. 54 In the final analysis, even the United States suc-
cumbed to protectionist arguments and the Truman Administra-
tion, which had led the Havana Charter talks, refused to submit
the treaty to the Senate where it would have been defeated.
Because economic recovery took precedence, the various GATT
rounds resembled diplomatic foreplay which consistently high-
lighted the failure of industrialized nations to reach a consensus.
The 1974 Tokyo Round was significant in one respect, however,
because it addressed, for the first time, non-tariff barriers includ-
ing subsidies, restrictive technical standards and the like.55 Non-
tariff barriers had, of course, by this time become a significant is-
sue in their own right.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of its ring of
satellite states provided a catalyst to the GATT process at the end
of the 1980s. For forty years, the world had experienced an on-
going ideological and strategic Cold War between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Suddenly, the remaining political
barriers to the global economy were gone and a myriad of new
economies became linked to the international system.
ism, and Unresolved Asymmetry Problems, 62 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2001, 2027 (1994) (discuss-
ing tariff and non-tariff trade barriers between GATT member nations and non-member
nations).
53 See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2178
(Mar. 24, 1948); see also Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From The Ha-
vana Charter To The World Trade Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 123, 125-27
(1995) (discussing failings of Havana Charter and ITO).
54 Economic nationalism continues to be an obstacle to the GATT system in the U.S. and
around the world. Robert Gilpin has characterized the ideology of those who regard na-
tional economic interests as essential to the security of the state as "benign mercantilism."
GInPrN, supra note 45, at 31-32.
55 See Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing World Economy, 29 INr'L
LAw. 15, 16-17 (1995) (noting how as result of Tokyo Round tariffs affect only small per-
centage of total value of global trade in goods). See generally GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE ANDm H ToKyo RouND NEGOmuTION 256-72 (1987) (discussing non-tariff
barriers as discussed during Tokyo Round negotiations).
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VII. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
For most of its early decades, GATT was more or less an organi-
zation through which parties resolved their bilateral trade dis-
putes by negotiation. In this respect, it was more of a political
forum than an adjudicatory one. For years, the United States had
sought a more legalistic (i.e., Americanized) fashion of dispute res-
olution that would adjudge trade disputes according to an estab-
lished, but evolving body of international trade law. This effort
was resisted by other states which viewed the American effort as
one that would make GATT too powerful.
The persistent problem of non-tariff barriers caused the United
States to act increasingly unilaterally against offending nations.
Heightened aggressiveness by the Reagan Administration was the
impetus behind the finalization of the WTO. Initially, much of the
industrialized world had resisted United States proposals for a
highly organized and legalistic WTO. 56 In view of increased Amer-
ican unilateralism, however, both the European Community and
Japan realized that the best way to restrain the United States
was to adopt the American proposals for the WTO. 57 Suddenly, a
strong legalistic GATT was viewed as a means of countering the
United States and deterring it from unilateral acts of which it
alone was capable.
CONCLUSION
The central thesis of Hobbes' Leviathan is that to restrain man's
natural urges and aggressions, the Sovereign must have the abso-
lute power to regulate the individuals' intercourse with all other
56 See Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime, The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 J. INT'L L.
& PRAc. 3, 6 (1995). The American approach to the WTO is best summarized by Kendall
Stiles. "[Tihe legalist position has been embraced most consistently by the United States-
primarily because it was felt that since United States law was more consistent with GATT,
and therefore advocacy of strict compliance more often than not favored existing legislation
and gave the representative the moral high ground." Id. See generally John H. Jackson,
The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The D.I.S.C. Case in GATT, 72 AM J. INT'L. L.
747-48, 753-81 (1978) (detailing glacial pace of dispute resolution under GATT rules of
1970s).
57 Bello & Holmer, supra note 31, at 1098-99; see also Steven P. Croley & John H. Jack-
son, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, And Deference to National Govern-
ments, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 193 (1996) (providing historical and analytical analysis of GATT
and WTO talks between Japan, European Community, and United States both historically
and analytically).
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individuals.58 In this brief overview of how the WTO and GATT
evolved, it is apparent that international law has finally developed
to the point where it will play the role of Hobbes' Sovereign in
regulating the interaction of individual states.
The most significant challenge to the new WTO remains the is-
sue of non-tariff barriers. Complex and very often insidious non-
tariff barriers take all forms and are far more difficult to define
and to curtail than simple tariffs. Indeed, many experts have
noted that such barriers will be permanent fixtures of interna-
tional trade for years to come. Such barriers include: the Arab
League Boycott of Israel and of multinational corporations that do
business there; Japan's exclusionary business practices, known as
the "Keiretsu"; and, the European Community's heavy agricul-
tural subsidies. Despite the supposed trend away from govern-
mental involvement with industrial performance, experts have
noted that such participation is increasingly more important. In-
stead of fighting this trend, it has been suggested that policymak-
ers accept a "market access regime" which recognizes the perma-
nence of public-private sector coordination in national economies:
International agreements cannot end this assistance; Inter-
national rules provide for timely review of the concerns of for-
eign competitors and, in some cases, lead to limited harmoni-
zation of national policies. The best guarantee of efficient
competition is using trade or investment, including alliances,
to introduce robust foreign competitors in all major economic
centers. Such a strategy undercuts the benefits of protection-
ist policies by letting foreign competitors share in any special
benefits conferred by trade barriers or special assistance to
boost particular industries.59
Although it is far from certain what the future will bring under
the new WTO regime, many policymakers have begun to eschew
58 See THoMAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 161 (1988). Hobbes provided the most extreme view
of individual competition, and by analogy, intrastate competition:
I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of
Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes
that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that
he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power
and the means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.
Id.; see also Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FoRDHAm
INT'L L.J. 1685, 1687-90 (1995) (distinguishing between Hobbesian and Lockean views of
interstate relations).
59 Peter F. Cowley & Jonathan D. Aronson, A New Trade Order, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 183,
184 (1993).
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standard models and formulas. The continued growth of multina-
tional conglomerates, the rapid industrialization and moderniza-
tion of formerly Third World Nations, and the demise of ideologi-
cal conflict have raised all sorts of possibilities. The whole idea of
the nation-state as the central actor on the world stage has been
challenged by those who view regional economic zones as the
emerging primary unit of the international community.60 These
transformations have had an impact upon all facets of interna-
tional relations. Clearly, military force is no longer an option
where the most serious disputes between states are based on com-
merce, even where that commerce is tied to national security. The
drag that non-tariff barriers place on economic growth can only be
addressed through bilateral negotiations or a multilateral ap-
proach through the WTO. It may be trite to suggest but, perhaps
after centuries of conflict, mankind has finally buried the Hobbes-
ian savage and accepted the primacy of international law.
60 See Kenichi Ohmae, The Rise of the Region State, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 78, 79-81 (1993)
(suggesting that "region States," economic units traversing national boundaries, are prime
economic actors in international system); see also Harold Hongju Kob, A World Trans-
formed, 20 YALE J. INr'L L. ix, xi-xii (1995) (noting decline of importance of sovereignty).
See generally A. LeRoy Bennett, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 373-375 (5th ed. 1991) (dis-
cussing rise of the EEC). But see Robert W. Cox, Special Forces, States and World Orders:
Beyond international Relations Theory, in NEOREALisM AND rIs CirIxcs 205 (Robert 0. Keo-
hane ed., 1986) Keohane stresses the continued importance of the state as the primary
actor. Id. Regional trade systems are not necessarily formalized by treaty or legal sanction.
See Hornbeck, supra note 31 ("NAFTA represents only one of many influences on bilat-
eral trade flows and is often not most important").
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